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Abstract 
We examine whether meetings between the SEC Chair and public companies facilitate regulatory 
capture. Our analyses indicate that firms seek out meetings with the SEC Chair, as meetings are 
more likely to occur for politically active rather than industry leading firms, and meetings are more 
likely to occur during periods when the firm is under nonpublic investigation. In addition, we find 
that firms with meetings benefit from reduced monetary penalties, and that these reduced penalties 
are attributable, in part, to the favorable selection of the adjudication forum. These findings extend 
our understanding of how regulatory capture occurs at the SEC, and suggest that closed-door 
meetings between the SEC Chair and public companies may facilitate regulatory capture by 
providing a forum that helps firms negotiate for and obtain favorable regulatory outcomes.  
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1. Introduction 
Regulatory capture occurs when political connections help firms extract rents from public 
agents like politicians and regulators (e.g., Stigler, 1971). Early studies of regulatory capture 
focused on how a company’s connection to governmental agencies influenced regulatory 
approvals (e.g., Federal Trade Commission) and how changes in elected officials affected 
connected companies’ financial condition (e.g., stock price responses to changes in who controls 
the US Senate). Recently, a few studies have suggested that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is also subject to regulatory capture (e.g., Correia, 2014; Heese, Khan and 
Ramanna, 2018) since its resources are set by Congress and its commissioners are appointed by 
the President. While these studies provide evidence indicating that politically connected firms 
obtain more favorable regulatory outcomes, they do not provide evidence explaining how the 
structure of the SEC’s operations facilitate regulatory capture nor do they explain how politically 
connected firms are able to work with the SEC to obtain regulatory benefits.  
We suggest that closed-door meetings between the SEC Chair and public companies may 
facilitate regulatory capture by providing a forum that helps firms negotiate for and obtain 
favorable regulatory outcomes. SEC Chairs have broad responsibilities to satisfy the mission of 
the SEC to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets and facilitate capital 
formation. SEC documentation states that the agency will “proactively seek out information from 
market experts both inside and outside the SEC to help inform the regulatory process, look for new 
risks, understand the impact of significant market events, and ensure that rules and registrants’ 
disclosures take into account the latest market environment and practices.” As a result, SEC Chairs 
have busy calendars where they meet with elected officials, other regulatory agencies, academics 
and public companies.  
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We focus on meetings with public companies because we posit that those may facilitate 
regulatory capture by providing a private venue for companies to talk directly with and seek the 
advice of the SEC Chair, the individual most responsible for the regulatory agenda of the agency. 
One critical aspect that determines whether SEC Chair meetings facilitate regulatory capture is the 
nature of the company. To the extent that the purpose of these meetings is to support the SEC 
mission of an effective regulatory regime, the types of companies meeting with the SEC Chair 
should either have strong governance practices or generally be among the most important in the 
US economy and in their respective industry. In contrast, to the extent that these meetings are a 
response to regulatory capture, then we will observe a disproportionate representation of politically 
connected firms. 
Our first set of empirical tests examine whether industry leading or politically active 
companies are more likely to meet with the SEC Chair. We identify politically active companies 
using the natural log of total Political Action Committee (“PAC”) contributions for the year. We 
identify firms that are industry leading from a corporate governance perspective using the 
entrenchment index (E_Index) developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008), and from an 
economic perspective using the various measures of bellwether firms  in Bonsall, Bozanic, and 
Fischer (2013). We find a positive and significant association between a company’s PAC 
contributions and the likelihood that it meets with the SEC Chair. The coefficients suggest that 
this association is economically meaningful, as increasing PAC from the median to the third 
quartile increases the probability of a SEC Chair meeting by approximately 8%. In contrast, we 
find that neither strong governance nor bellwether firms are more likely to meet with the SEC 
Chair. Collectively, our evidence suggests that SEC Chair meetings are with politically active 
rather than industry leading firms, consistent with regulatory capture. 
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We supplement the above analysis by examining whether there is also time variation in 
SEC Chair meetings that reflect regulatory capture. More specifically, we examine whether 
companies are more likely to meet with the SEC Chair when they are under formal investigation 
by the SEC. Formal investigations occur prior to enforcement actions and are nonpublic 
information—we requested and received the start and end date of each formal investigation for the 
past 15 years from the SEC. If SEC Chair meetings are driven by the agenda and preferences of 
the SEC Chair, we would not expect SEC Chair meetings to be more frequent during periods when 
those companies are under investigation. In contrast, if SEC Chair meetings are driven by the 
agenda and preferences of the companies, then meetings will be more frequent during periods 
when the company is under investigation. Consistent with regulatory capture, we find that SEC 
Chair meetings are more frequent during periods where the firm is under formal investigation.  
Overall, these two sets of analyses suggest that firms seek out meetings with the SEC Chair, 
as meetings are more likely to occur for politically active rather than industry leading firms, and 
meetings are more likely to occur during periods when the firm is under formal investigation. Next, 
we consider whether firms profit from these meetings through more favorable enforcement 
outcomes. As a first step, we focus on monetary outcomes, and estimate the effect of SEC Chair 
meetings on monetary outcomes. We find that both SEC Chair meetings and the level of PAC 
contributions reduce monetary penalties, and that the economic strength of the Meet variable is 
stronger than the PAC variable at explaining the reduction in monetary penalties. 
Lastly, we examine one potential driver of the more favorable enforcement outcomes for 
firms that meet with the SEC Chair: the choice of enforcement venue. All enforcement actions 
brought by the SEC are adjudicated either in federal district court or through administrative 
proceedings. In general, cases routed to federal district court are considerably more expensive to 
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litigate, and outcomes are more uncertain. This occurs because Administrative courts limit 
discovery and place relatively short time limits on pre-trail motions and preparation. In addition, 
the administrative law judge (ALJ) overseeing these proceedings is hired by the SEC staff and paid 
by the SEC, unlike federal judges who are appointed through political processes. We find that 
companies with SEC Chair meetings are substantially more likely to be routed to administrative 
proceedings, suggesting that venue selection may partially explain how the benefits of regulatory 
capture are obtained. 
We provide evidence suggesting that SEC Chair meetings are disproportionately attended 
by politically active companies, and that these meetings confer benefits through reduced regulatory 
penalties. In addition, our evidence suggests that these benefits are an outcome of a favorable 
selection of the adjudication forum. While it is natural to view lower monetary penalties as 
evidence of cooperation, we do not believe that our results can be interpreted in that way because 
when we examined the text of the enforcement actions for companies with SEC Chair meetings, 
we did not identify any explicit mention of leniency due to cooperation.  
Our main contribution is to the literature that examines whether there is SEC regulatory 
capture. Correia (2014) documents that politically connected firms are less likely to be involved 
in SEC enforcement actions and face lower penalties if they are prosecuted by the SEC. Similarly, 
Heese, Khan and Ramanna (2018) find that firm political connections positively predict comment 
letter reviews and substantive characteristics of such reviews, including the number of issues 
evaluated and the seniority of SEC staff involved. We add to these studies by showing that SEC 
Chair meetings and adjudication forum are used to sustain regulatory capture. 
We also add to the literature that investigates the choice of SEC enforcement target and the 
intensity of enforcement activity. For example, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) document that the SEC 
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is more likely to target firms headquartered close to its offices, which they suggest is because of 
resource constraints at the agency. deHaan, Kedia, Koh and Rajgopal (2015) document that the 
“revolving door” for trial lawyers at the SEC’s enforcement division generally promotes more 
aggressive regulatory activity because it encourages SEC lawyers to showcase their enforcement 
expertise to potential future employers. We add to these explanations by finding that regulatory 
capture also plays in a role in SEC enforcement activity. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Our study primarily contributes to the literature that examines SEC enforcement. Most 
early studies in this area examine the consequences of enforcement actions. For example, Feroz, 
Park, and Pastena (1991) examine 223 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) 
issued between 1982 and 1989 to document that most accounting-based enforcement actions relate 
to revenue recognition issues, and that the release of an AAER is associated with substantial 
negative abnormal returns. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008b) document similar adverse 
consequences for firms subject to enforcement actions—they find that for each dollar that a firm 
misleadingly inflates its market value, it loses this dollar plus an additional $3.08 through monetary 
fines and decreases in share price when its misconduct is revealed. Relatedly, Karpoff, Lee and 
Martin (2008a) track the employment consequences of managers at firms subject to enforcement 
actions, and find that culpable managers bear substantial financial losses through job loss, 
restrictions on their future employment, losses in the value of their shareholders, and SEC fines.  
Even though prior studies have generally found that the majority of fraud detection does 
not rely on the SEC, but rather on several different actors, including employees, the media and 
industry regulators (e.g., Dyck, Morse and Zingales, 2010), the SEC continues to play an important 
role in punishing detected fraud. As a result, more recent studies have begun to investigate the 
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choice of enforcement target and the intensity of enforcement activity. For example, Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011) document that the SEC is more likely to target firms headquartered close to its 
offices, which they suggest is because of resource constraints at the agency. deHaan, Kedia, Koh 
and Rajgopal (2015) document that the “revolving door” for trial lawyers at the SEC’s enforcement 
division generally promotes more aggressive regulatory activity because it encourages SEC 
lawyers to showcase their enforcement expertise to potential future employers. 
Our study examines whether meetings with the SEC Chair have consequences for 
enforcement outcomes. The goal of the SEC, as outlined in its strategic plan, is to establish and 
maintain an effective regulatory environment that promotes high-quality disclosure, financial 
reporting, and governance, and prevents abusive practices by market participants. To support this 
objective, the SEC notes that it will “proactively seek out information from market experts both 
inside and outside the SEC to help inform the regulatory process, look for new risks, understand 
the impact of significant market events, and ensure that rules and registrants’ disclosures take into 
account the latest market environment and practices.” This evidence suggests that meetings should 
occur between the SEC Chair and the most important firms in the US economy and in their 
respective industry. 
It is also possible that meetings between firms and the SEC Chair occur because of 
regulatory capture. The broad finding from this literature is that political connections help firms 
extract rents from public agents like politicians and regulators (e.g., Stigler, 1971). Within this 
literature, a small number of studies examine the link between political expenditures and 
enforcement decisions by different governmental agencies. Gordon and Hafer (2005) document 
lower investigation rates by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for firms that make PAC 
contributions. Similarly, Richter et al. (2009) show that lobbying firms experience lower tax rates, 
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possibly as a result of more lenient interpretation and enforcement of tax laws by the IRS. Taken 
together, these findings are consistent with political expenditures being associated with favorable 
treatment by regulatory agencies. 
With regard to the SEC, Congress determines the SEC’s budget and oversees its operations, 
while the president of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints SEC 
commissioners and names the SEC chairman. As such, pursuing enforcement actions against 
politically connected firms could be costly to SEC commissioners and staff if such actions 
antagonize the SEC’s overseers. Consistent with this conjecture, Correia (2014) documents that 
politically connected firms are less likely to be involved in SEC enforcement actions and face 
lower penalties if they are prosecuted by the SEC. Similarly, Heese, Khan and Ramanna (2018) 
find that firm political connections positively predict comment letter reviews and substantive 
characteristics of such reviews, including the number of issues evaluated and the seniority of SEC 
staff involved. 
Our view of regulatory capture is very similar to that in Correia (2014) and Heese et al. 
(2018). In both of those studies, the underlying assumption is that SEC officials consider the 
political connections of the firm when deciding on enforcement proceedings. We extend these 
studies by considering one specific mechanism through which politically connected firms can 
receive favorable regulatory treatment: meetings with the SEC Chair. To the extent that SEC Chair 
meetings are in response to regulatory capture, then these meetings will occur between politically 
active firms. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Politically active firms are more likely to meet with SEC Chairs 
As previously noted, the tension in this hypothesis arises, in part, because of the SEC’s 
stated objective that it seeks out market experts in designing an effective regulatory environment. 
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Under this explanation, the types of companies meeting with the SEC Chair would generally be 
among the most important in the US economy and in their respective industry, and not those with 
strong political connections. Like both Correia (2014) and Heese et al. (2018), an important 
assumption of our analyses is that SEC officials, and in particular the SEC Chair, are aware of 
firms’ political connectedness. Anecdotal interview evidence of a top-down management style 
where politically astute senior SEC officials allocate and oversee staff reviews of firms reported 
in Heese et al. (2018) is supportive of this idea. 
 
3. Data Sources  
We obtained calendar data outlining the SEC Chair’s meeting schedule from the SEC’s 
website.1 The calendars are very specific; they report the exact date and time of each meeting. To 
illustrate, we provide an excerpt from the calendar of SEC Chair Mary L. Schapiro in Appendix 
B. This excerpt indicates that during the week of July 24, 2002, the SEC Chair had meetings with 
staff, agencies, SEC commissioners, inspector generals, elected officials, and the leaders of two 
publicly traded companies—James McNerney, the CEO of Boeing, and Nels Olson, the Vice 
Chairman of Korn Ferry. In this study, we focus on the meetings between the SEC Chair and 
publicly traded companies. The calendars are only available after 2009.2  
 We obtained information on formal investigations conducted by the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement through a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request.3 The opening and closing 
of an investigation represents the period of time under which the company is under formal review, 
but it is not the first step in the enforcement process. The first step in the enforcement process is 
                                                          
1 More precisely, we initially requested the SEC chairman’s calendar in 2013 using a Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) request. After receiving this information, the same data became publicly available at 
https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/sec-chair-calendar.htm. 
2 Calendar data is missing for the calendar year of 2011 and September 2012 to March 2013.  
3 https://www.sec.gov/page/office-foia-services  
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an informal inquiry, which typically commences after a triggering event (e.g., media stories, 
company filings, tips, or referrals) that is sufficient to generate “official curiosity” on the part of 
SEC staff.4 Informal inquiries are nonpublic, and consist of the voluntary provision of documents 
or testimony by the company to the SEC.  
Informal inquiries become formal investigations through a Formal Order of Investigation, 
which requires that the SEC articulate the relevant facts it has discovered to date, the potential 
violations of federal securities laws to be investigated and the specific staff members who will be 
conducting the investigation. Once a Formal Order of Investigation is issued, the enforcement 
staff has the subpoena power necessary to obtain evidence from the company and other 
knowledgeable entities (e.g., the company’s auditor). If the staff believes that charges are 
appropriate at the end of its fact-finding investigation, it provides a Wells Notice. The Wells Notice 
does not mean that the SEC itself has determined that there was a violation of law. Rather, it is a 
notification to the company that the staff believes that a violation has occurred, that the Wells 
Notice recipients are responsible for the violation, and that the staff are recommending that the 
Commission authorize an enforcement action. A recipient of the Wells Notice will have an 
opportunity to provide a written submission to the staff that outlines why the staff should not 
pursue the enforcement action.  
There is no mandate that the firm disclose the receipt of a Wells Notice, and so typically 
the existence of an SEC investigation is nonpublic. The investigation data that we requested and 
received from the SEC is the only source that we are aware of for this data. The data we obtained 
lists all completed investigations and provides the SEC investigation tracking number, company 
name, investigation start date (i.e., the Formal Order of Investigation), and investigation end date. 
                                                          
4https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf  
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An excerpt of the data we received is provided in Appendix C. We limit our sample to investigation 
periods between 2002 and 2017 because the restatement data in Audit Analytics starts in 2002. We 
first fuzzy match company names in the investigation data set with company names in Compustat, 
and then manually verify each match. The data contains 1,603 unique investigations, which 
translates to 4,558 firm-years of investigations, between 2002 and 2017.   
 We identify all SEC enforcement actions between Oct. 1 2009 and Dec. 31 2016 through 
SEC Market Data published annually on the SEC’s website.5 All SEC enforcement actions are 
initiated by the SEC and there may be more than one defendant in a particular action.  We only 
include enforcement actions against publicly traded firms or managers in publicly traded firms. 
We collect Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions from The Center for Responsive 
Politics.6 Lastly, we use Audit Analytics to identify restatements (Restate). We only include 
restatements that are non-clerical errors.  
 We present our sample selection process in Table 1 Panel A. The meeting sample period 
is from 2008 through 2016, during which there are 146 firm-years with meetings between publicly 
traded firms and the SEC chair. If a firm meets more than once with the SEC chair during a 
calendar year, we treat it as one observation for that year. During the same period, there are 24,956 
firm-years with no meeting and non-missing information for the control variables.  
 We present descriptive statistics for our sample in Table 2. Firms with meetings on average 
make about $297,928 PAC contributions, which is higher than the average PAC contributions of 
$35,307 by firms with no meetings. In comparison to firms without meetings, firms with meetings 
                                                          
5 https://www.sec.gov/reports?aId=edit-field-article-sub-type-secart-
value&year=All&field_article_sub_type_secart_value=Reports+and+Publications-
SelectSECandMarketData&tid=All  
6 https://www.opensecrets.org  
11 
 
are larger firms (Size), have more analyst coverage (Analyst), are more likely to be a Fortune 100 
firms (Fortune), and less likely to be in an industry with high litigation risk (FPS). 
 
4. Research Design and Results 
4.1 What type of companies meet with the SEC Chair? 
Broadly speaking, we suggest that there are two competing reasons why the SEC Chair 
meets with certain companies. On the one hand, the SEC Chair may reach out to industry leading 
companies to seek their input and expertise as part of developing an effective regulatory 
environment. Under this explanation, there are two types of firms that we suggest the SEC will 
reach out to—those that exhibit the best corporate governance practices, which we refer to as 
strong governance firms, and those that are among the most important in the US economy and in 
their respective industry, which we refer to as bellwether firms. On the other hand, the companies 
meeting with the SEC Chair may be doing so because of their own agenda and preferences. An 
important component to such meetings is the company’s ability to get the attention of the SEC 
Chair. Therefore, to the extent that meeting requests occur because of company preferences, we 
suggest that meetings are more likely to occur for politically active companies because increasing 
levels of political activism are likely to increase the odds that the meeting is recommended to the 
SEC Chair by members of congress.  
Our first set of empirical tests examine whether strong governance, bellwether or politically 
active companies are more likely to meet with the SEC Chair. We use the following logit 
specification: 
Prob(Meeti,t) = f (PACi,t-1, E-Indexi,t-1, Bellwetheri,t-1, Controlsi,t-1)  (1) 
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The dependent variable Meet equals 1 if firm i meets with the SEC Chair in period t, and is 0 
otherwise. All independent variables are lagged one year from Meet because we are predicting 
how a set of covariates in the prior period predict the likelihood of a meeting with the SEC Chair 
in the current period. We identify politically active companies using PAC, which equals the natural 
log of total Political Action Committee (“PAC”) contributions for the year. We use the 
entrenchment index (E_Index) developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) to identify strong 
governance firms. The E_Index includes 6 provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers 
and charter amendment. This index ranges from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate worse 
corporate governance. We follow Cassell et al. (2013) and set missing values for the index to 0 
and include a separate indicator variable (Missing E_index) which equals 1 when the governance 
data are unavailable, and 0 otherwise.  
We follow prior literature (e.g., Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer, 2013) and define bellwether 
firms as firms whose earnings contain the most macroeconomic information. More specifically, 
we define Bellwether as an indicator variable equals 1 if the R2 of a firm is in the top 5 percentile 
in an industry-fiscal-year, and 0 otherwise. We first extract the R2 from the following regression: 
Ei,t = β0 + β1Em,t + εi,t   (2) 
where Ei,t is the firm-level quarterly income before extraordinary items scaled by the beginning 
market capitalization. Em,t is aggregate earnings, which is measured as the sum of all Compustat 
firms’ quarterly income before extraordinary items deflated by the sum of the beginning market 
capitalization. We use 20 quarters to estimate the regression. The R2 from the regression represents 
the extent to which a firm’s earnings contain information about the macroeconomic state. We then 
rank the R2 by year or industry-fiscal-year, and define the top 5 percentile of the distributions to 
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be bellwether firms. As we outline in more detail later, we also consider several alternative 
definitions of Bellwether to ensure that our conclusions are not sensitive to this research design 
choice. 
Our control variables follow from Correia (2014). We control for a number of firm specific 
financial characteristics, which include performance matched discretionary accruals (DA), which 
we measure following Kothari et al. (2005), total assets (Size), market to book ratio (M2B), and 
financial leverage (Leverage). We also control for firm age (Age), distance to the SEC headquarter 
(Distance), analyst coverage (Analyst), Fortune 100 companies (Fortune), and industries with high 
litigation risk (FPS). Age is the number of annual observations in Compustat. Distance is the 
natural log of the distance in miles between a firm’s headquarters and the closest SEC office. 
Analyst is the number of analysts covering a firm in a given year in IBES. Fortune is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 for Fortune 100 firms, and 0 otherwise. Following Kim and 
Skinner (2012), we categorize high litigation risk by industry groupings. FPS is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in a high litigation industry (i.e., biotech, computer, 
electrics, and retail industry), and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are included in Appendix A. 
The Results of equation (1) are provided in Table 3. To provide a more complete picture 
of how PAC, E-Index and Bellwether predict Meet, we provide regression results separately for 
PAC in Column (1), E-Index in Column (2), Bellwether in Column (3), and then Bellwether and 
PAC together in Column (4). In both Columns (1) and (4), the coefficients on PAC are positive 
and significant, indicating that there is a positive association between a company’s PAC 
contributions and the likelihood that it meets with the SEC Chair. The coefficients suggest that 
this association is economically meaningful. For example, in column (4), increasing PAC from the 
median to the third quartile increases the probability of a SEC Chair meeting by 8% (i.e., 0.062 * 
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(13.112 – 11.816)). In contrast, the coefficient on Bellwether is insignificant in both Columns (2) 
and (4), and the coefficient on E-Index is insignificant in Columns (3) and (4). These results 
suggest that neither the firm’s bellwether status or corporate governance practices are associated 
with SEC Chair meetings.  
We conduct a number of robustness tests to provide additional support for our conclusion 
that PAC is an important driver of SEC chair meetings. First, we drop size as a control variable to 
check if that control is affecting the coefficient on Bellwether. We find stronger results in this 
specification for the PAC coefficient (0.125 with p-value<0.01), but both bellwether and E-Index 
remain insignificant.  
Collectively, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that SEC Chair meetings are with politically 
active rather than Bellwether firms. To ensure that this conclusion is not attributable to our 
approach to identifying Bellwether firms, we conduct two sets of robustness tests. First, we drop 
size as a control variable to check if that control is affecting the coefficient on Bellwether. We find 
stronger results in this specification for the PAC coefficient (0.125 with p-value<0.01), but both 
bellwether and E-Index remain insignificant. Second, we use a number of alternative definitions 
for Bellwether. These alternative measures include defining Bellwether as an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 for firms that rank in the top 5 percent of sales, that rank in the top 10 
percent of sales, that rank in the top 5 percent of sales in a given industry-calendar-year, that rank 
in the top 10 percent of sales in a given industry-calendar-year, and that rank in the top 10 percent 
of sales in a given industry-fiscal-year.   
Table 4 shows that our main results remain similar using each of these seven alternative 
measures of bellwether. In each column, the coefficient on PAC is positive and statistically 
significant, with coefficients that range in value from 0.062 to 0.066. The robustness of the 
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coefficients on PAC across specifications is reassuring, as it suggests that our finding is not 
sensitive to research design choices. The coefficient on Bellwether is negative and significant in 
(2), and insignificant in all other columns. These coefficients indicate that a firm’s status as a 
bellwether firm is not associated with an increase in SEC Chair meetings. 
 
4.2 When do companies meet with the SEC Chair? 
A company’s desire to meet with the SEC Chair may vary over time based on a number of 
factors. We consider one such factor: whether the company is currently under formal investigation 
by the SEC. We examine this factor because it complements the analyses in Section 4.1 that 
indicate that politically active rather than industry leading firms are meeting with the SEC Chair. 
More specifically, if SEC Chair meetings are driven by the agenda and preferences of the SEC 
Chair, we would not expect that meetings with companies be more frequent during periods when 
those companies are under investigation. In contrast, if SEC Chair meetings are driven by the 
agenda and preferences of the companies, we would expect that meetings will be more frequent 
during periods when the company is under investigation. We examine these possibilities with the 
following specification: 
Prob(Meeti,t) = f (Investigationi,t, Controlsi,t-1)  (3) 
The dependent variable Meet equals 1 if firm i meets with the SEC Chair in period t, and is 0 
otherwise. The control variables mirror those used in equation (1). Investigate is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 for firm i in period t if the firm is under formal investigation in that period.  
 The results in Table 5 indicate that SEC Chair meetings are more frequent during periods 
where the firm is under information investigation as the coefficient on Investigate is positive and 
significant. The economic magnitude of the coefficient is substantial. In untabulated results, we 
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calculate the odds ratio of Investigate to be 2.7, suggesting that firms investigated by the SEC are 
nearly three time more likely to meet with the SEC than firms without an investigation. 
 We find similar results when we focus on the first year of the investigation period. More 
specifically, we re-estimate equation (3) using an alternative definition of investigate. Under this 
alternative approach, investigate is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if it is less than 
one year since the initiation of the formal investigation by the SEC, and zero otherwise. In 
untabulated results, the coefficient on investigate is 0.731 with a standard error of 0.299, indicating 
statistical significant at p-value<0.01. As in Table 5, the coefficients on both Bellwether and E-
Index remain insignificant.  
 
4.3 Are there economic benefits associated with SEC Chair meetings? 
 The analyses in Section 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that firms are seeking out meetings with the 
SEC Chair, as meetings are more likely to occur for politically active rather than industry leading 
firms, and meetings are more likely to occur during periods when the firm is under formal 
investigation. Next, we consider whether firms profit from these meetings through more favorable 
enforcement outcomes. As a first step, we focus on monetary outcomes, and estimate the effect of 
SEC Chair meetings on monetary outcomes using the following OLS specification: 
Monetary Penalties = f (PAC, Meet, controls)     (4) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of civil monetary settlement for each enforcement 
action. We focus on each enforcement action rather than aggregating enforcement actions at the 
firm level because each enforcement action is unique. More specifically, each enforcement action 
proceeds through the adjudication system based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
alleged wrongdoing. Because of our focus on each enforcement action, we define Meet as an 
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indicator variable that equals one if the firm met with the SEC chair between investigation start 
date and enforcement start date, and 0 otherwise. This definition ensures that the variable captures 
meetings that occurred before the monetary penalties were assessed. We include all the control 
variables from equation (1). In addition, we also control for a number of attributes of the case. 
More specifically, we control for case complexity using the natural log of total number of 
violations of securities laws (Violations) and the natural log of length (measured in years) to 
resolve an SEC enforcement (Length). We control for case severity by including an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 for those cases that involved a restatement (Restate), and by 
including an indicator variable equals 1 if an enforcement action involves fraud allegation (Fraud).  
The results of equation (4) are presented in Table 6. The coefficients on both Meet and 
PAC are negative and statistically significant in each column. Both sets of coefficients are also 
economically meaningful. In column (2), the coefficient on Meet is -2.949. To evaluate the 
economic significance of Meet, we generate the predictive values of monetary penalties by setting 
all variables at mean and shifting Meet from 0 to 1. We find that turning Meet from 0 to 1 is 
associated with a reduction in monetary penalties by about 22%,7 suggesting that a SEC Chair 
meeting has a meaningful impact on the ultimate monetary outcome. In column (3), we interact 
Meet and PAC and find that the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically insignificant. 
Next, we examine one potential driver of the more favorable enforcement outcomes for 
companies that meet with the SEC Chair: the choice of enforcement venue. All enforcement 
actions brought by the SEC are civil in nature, as the agency has no authority to bring criminal 
cases. The SEC has two forums in which to bring its enforcement actions: federal district court 
                                                          
7 The predictive value of monetary penalties is 13.173 when setting Meet equal 0 and all other variables at means. The 
predictive value of monetary penalties is 10.245 when setting Meet equal 1 and all other variables at means. The 
economic significance of Meet is calculated as (10.245-13.173)/13.173*100%=-22% 
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and administrative proceedings. There are a number of procedural safeguards for respondents in 
federal court that are absent in administrative proceedings, which make cases heard in federal court 
more expensive and more independent of the SEC’s enforcement philosophy. Specifically, Federal 
Judges are appointed through political processes, unlike administrative law judges (ALJ), who are 
hired by the SEC staff and paid by the SEC. Cases routed through administrative court are also 
more aligned with SEC priorities on appeal, as the first-level appeal from an ALJ ruling is to the 
full commission—the same commission that authorized the formal order of investigation in the 
first place. Procedurally, there is no right to a jury trial, and there are time limits as to how long 
after the case is filed the ALJ decision must be issued, thus simplifying and expediting the judicial 
process. Even though the SEC won more than 90% of its cases filed in administrative courts 
compared with only 69% in federal district courts, the defense costs and litigation penalties are far 
lower in administrative court.8 
Based on these differences, we expect companies to prefer administrative court, and 
suggest that at least one potential reason why companies that meet with the SEC Chair have lower 
enforcement penalties is because their actions are more likely to be adjudicated in administrative 
court. We test this prediction using the following logit model:  
Prob (SEC Admin) = f (PAC, Meet, controls)   (5) 
The dependent variable equals 1 if the case was routed to SEC administrative proceedings, and 0 
if the case was routed to federal district court. All independent variables are defined in the same 
way as equation (4). The results in Table 7 indicate that meetings and the firm’s political 
connections both play a role in the SEC’s venue selection process as both Meet and PAC have 
positive and significant coefficients. These results suggest that firms that meet with the SEC chair 
                                                          
8 Jean Eaglesham, “SEC Wins With In-house Judges,” Wall Street Journal, May 6, 
2015, http://on.wsj.com/1AKOxEH 
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and donate more are more likely to be routed to the SEC administrative proceedings. The 
coefficient magnitude of Meet, however, is larger than the coefficient magnitude of PAC.  
 
4.4 Changes in PAC Contributions around SEC Investigations 
We provide further support for our conclusions in Section 4.2 by examining the how PAC 
contributions change differently across firms with and without SEC chair meetings. If the SEC 
proactively seeks to meet with firms to fulfill its regulatory role of improving the overall welfare 
of the capital market, there should be no difference in PAC contribution patterns across firms with 
and without meetings in response to SEC investigations. On the other hand, if firms initiate 
meetings for private benefits, we expect to see an increase in PAC contributions for firms that meet 
with the SEC chair while under SEC investigation when compared to firms that do not meet with 
the SEC chair. The results in Table 8 are consistent with this second alternative. Panel A presents 
the descriptive statistics of PAC contributions split by whether the company met with the SEC 
Chair or not, and Panel B presents descriptive statistics with a further split by Federal and 
Administrative court. We observe that firms that meet with the SEC in general have larger PAC 
contributions than firms that do not, and that firms routed through Administrative court have larger 
PAC contributions than firms routed through Federal court. 
 
4.5 Robustness Tests 
We estimate a series of rare event logistic regression models developed by Tomz, King, 
and Zeng (2003) since SEC Chair meetings (our variable of interest) is a relatively rare event. This 
alternative specification addresses the econometric concern that coefficients may be biased away 
from the null when the dependent variable is a rare event (defined as dependent variable differs 
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from the mode in less than 5 percent of cases by King and Zeng 2001). We re-run our main results 
in Table 3 and report the rare event logit results in Table 9. We find that our results are robust to 
the rare event logit methodology. Specifically, we find that PAC loads positively and significantly 
in Table 9, with coefficients that are similar to those in our main specification.  
 
4.6 Summary of Results 
Collectively, we provide evidence suggesting that SEC Chair meetings are 
disproportionately attended by politically active companies, and that these meetings confer 
benefits through reduced regulatory penalties. In addition, our evidence suggests that these benefits 
are an outcome of a favorable selection of the adjudication forum. While it is natural to view lower 
monetary penalties as evidence of cooperation, we do not believe that our results can be interpreted 
in that way because when we examined the text of the enforcement actions for companies with 
SEC Chair meetings, we did not identify any explicit mention of leniency due to cooperation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Recent studies have suggested that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is 
subject to regulatory capture (e.g., Correia, 2014; Heese, Khan and Ramanna, 2018) since 
Congress allocates its resources and the President appoints its commissioners. While these studies 
provide evidence indicating that politically connected firms obtain more favorable regulatory 
outcomes, they do not provide evidence explaining how the structure of the SEC’s operations 
facilitate regulatory capture nor do they explain how politically connected firms are able to work 
with the SEC to obtain regulatory benefits. We extend these studies by showing that SEC Chair 
meetings enable regulatory capture. Our analyses suggest that firms seek out meetings with the 
SEC Chair, as meetings are more likely to occur for politically active rather than industry leading 
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firms, and meetings are more likely to occur during periods when the firm is under nonpublic 
investigation. In addition, we find that firms with meetings benefit from reduced monetary 
penalties, and that these reduced penalties are attributable, in part, to the favorable selection of the 
adjudication forum. These findings extend our understanding of how regulatory capture occurs at 
the SEC. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions  
Variable Name Definition 
PAC ($) Total PAC contributions in the current year. 
PAC Natural log of PAC. 
Bellwether 
An indicator variable equals 1 if the R2 of a firm is in the top 5 
percentile in an industry-fiscal-year, and 0 otherwise. The R2 is 
estimated by regressing a firm's earnings on aggregate earnings using 
five years of data. Firm's earnings are quarterly income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market capitalization. 
Aggregate earnings are the sum of all Compustat firms' quarterly 
income before extraordinary items divided by the sum of all Compustat 
firms' beginning market capitalization. 
Restate An indicator variable equals 1 if there is a restatement per Audit Analytics, and 0 otherwise. 
Meet Meet equals one if the firm met with the SEC chair between investigation start date and enforcement start date, and 0 otherwise. 
E_Index 
Following Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008), we create the 
entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for merger and charter amendments. These 
data are obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services on WRDS. 
Investigate An indicator variable equals 1 if the firm-year is at risk of investigation, and 0 otherwise. 
DA Performance matched discretionary accruals. We estimate DACC following Kothari et al. (2005). 
Size Natural log of total assets. 
M2B Market to book ratio (CEQ/PRCC_F*CSHO). 
Leverage Total debts divided by total assets. 
Age Number of annual observations of a firm in Compustat. 
Distance Distance between the firm's headquarter and the SEC. 
Analyst Number of analysts covering a firm in a given year in IBES. 
Fortune An indicator variable equals 1 if the firm is one of the Fortune 100 firms according to Compustat, and 0 otherwise. 
FPS 
Equals 1 if the firm is in the biotech (SIC codes 2833–2836 and 8731–
8734), computer (3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics (3600–3674), 
or retail (5200–5961) industry, and 0 otherwise 
Defendants Natural log of number of defendants in an SEC enforcement action. 
Violations Natural log of total number of violations of securities laws. 
Fraud An indicator variable equals 1 if an enforcement action involves fraud allegation, and 0 otherwise. 
Investigate An indicator variable equals 1 if the enforcement was related to an investigation, and 0 otherwise. 
Length Natural log of length (measured in years) to resolve an SEC enforcement. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions (continued) 
Variable Name Definition 
bell_leader_5 
An indicator variable equals 1 if a firm’s sales are within top 5 
percentile among all firms in that period, and 0 otherwise. 
 
bell_leader_10 An indicator variable equals 1 if a firm's sales is in the top 10 percentile in a given year. 
bell_ep5_ind_dec 
An indicator variable equals 1 if the R2 of a firm is in the top 5 
percentile in an industry-calendar-year, and 0 otherwise. The R2 is 
estimated by regressing a firm's earnings on aggregate earnings using 
five years of data. Firm's earnings are quarterly income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market capitalization. 
Aggregate earnings are the sum of all Compustat firms' quarterly 
income before extraordinary items divided by the sum of all Compustat 
firms' beginning market capitalization. 
bell_ep10_ind_year 
An indicator variable equals 1 if the R2 of a firm is in the top 10 
percentile in an industry-fiscal-year, and 0 otherwise. The R2 is 
estimated by regressing a firm's earnings on aggregate earnings using 
five years of data. Firm's earnings are quarterly income before 
extraordinary items sclaed by the beginning market capitalization. 
Aggregate earnings are the sum of all Compustat firms' quarterly 
income before extraordinary items divided by the sum of all Compustat 
firms' beginning market capitalization. 
bell_ep10_ind_dec 
An indicator variable equals 1 if the R2 of a firm is in the top 10 
percentile in an industry-calendar-year, and 0 otherwise. The R2 is 
estimated by regressing a firm's earnings on aggregate earnings using 
five years of data. Firm's earnings are quarterly income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market capitalization. 
Aggregate earnings are the sum of all Compustat firms' quarterly 
income before extraordinary items divided by the sum of all Compustat 
firms' beginning market capitalization. 
bell_leader_mkt5 An indicator variable equals 1 if a firm's sales is in the top 5 percentile in a given industry-year. 
bell_leader_mkt10 An indicator variable equals 1 if a firm's sales is in the top 10 percentile in a given industry-year. 
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Appendix B: Calendar Excerpt for Chairman Mary L. Schapiro9 
 
                                                          
9 https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/sec-chair-calendar.htm  
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Appendix C: Sample of Investigation Data 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample selection    
Criteria Meet=1 Meet=0 Total 
Number of firm-years in Compustat with non-missing information for 
control variables 153 43,148 43,301 
Number of firm-years missing information for bellwether calculation 
and missing IBES information 7 18,192 18,199 
Final Sample 146 24,956 25,102 
 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by fiscal year 
Fiscal Year Meet=0 Meet=1 Total 
2008 3,351 29 3,380 
2009 3,312 33 3,345 
2011 3,259 10 3,269 
2012 3,226 18 3,244 
2013 3,246 20 3,266 
2014 3,097 19 3,116 
2015 2,876 12 2,888 
2016 2,589 5 2,594 
Total 24,956 146 25,102 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for sample used for the regression analysis in Table C.  
 Firm-years with meetings (N=146)  Firm-years without meetings (N=24,956) 
 25%tile Median 75%tile SD Mean  25%tile Median 75%tile SD Mean 
PAC ($) 0 $135,460 $495,000 $400,666 $297,928  0 0 $0 $170,145 $35,307 
PAC (log) 0 11.816 13.112 5.829 8.443  0 0 0.000 4.282 1.966 
Bellwether 0 0 0 0.276 0.082  0 0 0 0.230 0.056 
E_Index 3 4 7 2.041 4.568  4 7 7 1.685 5.880 
Accruals -0.039 -0.005 0.033 0.120 -0.007  -0.072 -0.006 0.053 0.162 -0.015 
Size 8.838 10.095 10.807 1.536 9.735  5.489 6.831 8.208 1.969 6.883 
M2B 0.898 1.341 2.200 4.016 2.184  0.994 1.742 3.169 4.601 2.532 
Leverage 0.600 0.791 0.919 0.207 0.746  0.340 0.522 0.691 0.261 0.532 
Age 14 21.5 42 18.905 28.000  10 18 29 16.317 22.369 
Distance 5.329 6.138 7.051 1.290 6.328  5.803 6.805 7.735 1.417 6.694 
Analyst 11 21 28 11.011 19.815  4 8 16 9.319 11.050 
Fortune 0 0 1 0.444 0.267  0 0 0 0.152 0.024 
FPS 0 0 0 0.322 0.116   0 0 1 0.468 0.324 
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Table 3: Determinants of Meetings 
This table presents the results of estimating the following logit model: Pr (Meeting) = f( PAC, Bellwether, 
controls). The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm has met with the SEC, and 0 otherwise. All independent 
variables are from one year before the meeting year. Standard errors are clustered by issuer and reported in the 
brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.  Industry and year fixed effects are included for all regressions. Standard errors are 
clustered by issuer and reported in the brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PAC 0.067**     0.062** 
  [0.029]     [0.030] 
Bellwether  0.048  -0.07 
  [0.334]  [0.338] 
E_Index   -0.056 -0.066 
   [0.168] [0.173] 
DA 0.89 0.93 0.917 0.892 
 [0.793] [0.771] [0.788] [0.798] 
Size 0.719*** 0.794*** 0.804*** 0.729*** 
 [0.103] [0.110] [0.114] [0.110] 
M2B -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] 
Leverage 2.252*** 2.380*** 2.472*** 2.327*** 
 [0.568] [0.528] [0.542] [0.591] 
Age -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
Distance -0.152 -0.169* -0.153 -0.141 
 [0.095] [0.095] [0.098] [0.095] 
Analyst 0.012 0.019 0.008 0.005 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.019] 
Fortune 0.211 0.329 0.226 0.132 
 [0.365] [0.357] [0.339] [0.349] 
FPS 0.960* 0.882* 0.907* 0.970* 
 [0.528] [0.512] [0.507] [0.526] 
Constant -11.512*** -11.932*** -11.550*** -11.149*** 
 [1.151] [1.121] [1.321] [1.418] 
          
Observations 25,102 25,102 25,102 25,102 
Missing E-Index No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.38 0.373 0.375 0.382 
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Table 4: Robustness Check -- Different Specifications of Bell Weather Firms 
This table replicate column (3) of Table 2 using various measures for Bellwether firms. The bellwether measure is specified at 
the top of each regression. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Industry and year fixed 
effects are included for all regressions. Standard errors are clustered by issuer and reported in the brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Bell Weather 
Measure bell_leader_5 
bell_leader
_10 
bell_ep5_ind_
december 
bell_ep10_ind
_december 
bell_ep10_i
nd_year 
bell_leader
_mkt5 
bell_ep10_ind
_december 
PAC 0.062** 0.066** 0.062** 0.063** 0.063** 0.065** 0.062** 
  [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] 
Bellwether 0.074 -0.608* -0.4 -0.432 -0.286 -0.603 -0.033 
  [0.280] [0.311] [0.497] [0.403] [0.330] [0.480] [0.355] 
E_Index -0.06 -0.087 -0.07 -0.067 -0.066 -0.069 -0.064 
 [0.170] [0.170] [0.174] [0.174] [0.174] [0.168] [0.173] 
DA 0.9 0.88 0.899 0.89 0.892 0.871 0.9 
 [0.802] [0.805] [0.800] [0.798] [0.801] [0.798] [0.802] 
Size 0.728*** 0.760*** 0.729*** 0.727*** 0.726*** 0.742*** 0.731*** 
 [0.111] [0.113] [0.110] [0.110] [0.110] [0.111] [0.111] 
M2B -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] 
Leverage 2.328*** 2.302*** 2.326*** 2.307*** 2.318*** 2.337*** 2.329*** 
 [0.591] [0.586] [0.591] [0.589] [0.589] [0.586] [0.590] 
Age -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Distance -0.139 -0.164* -0.144 -0.148 -0.146 -0.153 -0.142 
 [0.097] [0.095] [0.095] [0.094] [0.094] [0.093] [0.096] 
Analyst 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
Fortune 0.09 0.361 0.132 0.122 0.135 0.566 0.143 
 [0.325] [0.370] [0.349] [0.345] [0.351] [0.486] [0.391] 
FPS 0.975* 0.948* 0.965* 0.958* 0.963* 0.963* 0.971* 
 [0.523] [0.535] [0.527] [0.526] [0.525] [0.530] [0.525] 
Constant -11.178*** -11.225*** -11.135*** -11.090*** -11.060*** -11.248*** -11.177*** 
 [1.403] [1.402] [1.404] [1.414] [1.428] [1.411] [1.405] 
                
Observations 25,102 25,102 25,102 25,102 25,102 25,102 25,102 
Missing E-
Index Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.382 0.384 0.382 0.383 0.382 0.383 0.382 
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Table 5: Meeting Timing 
This table presents the results of estimating the following logit model: Pr (Meeting) = f (Investigate, controls). 
The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm has met with the SEC, and 0 otherwise. Investigate equals 1 if the 
firm-year is at risk of investigation, and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Industry and year fixed effects are included for all 
regressions. Standard errors are clustered by issuer and reported in the brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Investigate   1.031*** 1.003*** 
    [0.242] [0.247] 
Bellwether   -0.056 
   [0.340] 
E_Index   -0.013 
   [0.167] 
DA 0.927 0.994 0.989 
 [0.773] [0.787] [0.801] 
Size 0.793*** 0.760*** 0.771*** 
 [0.109] [0.098] [0.104] 
M2B -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] 
Leverage 2.378*** 2.314*** 2.387*** 
 [0.527] [0.539] [0.552] 
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Distance -0.170* -0.153* -0.139 
 [0.095] [0.090] [0.091] 
Analyst 0.019 0.02 0.01 
 [0.015] [0.014] [0.018] 
Fortune 0.332 0.157 0.091 
 [0.355] [0.346] [0.336] 
FPS 0.881* 0.842 0.868* 
 [0.512] [0.513] [0.508] 
Constant -11.919*** -11.928*** -11.722*** 
 [1.109] [1.122] [1.368] 
        
Observations 25,102 25,102 25102 
Missing E-Index No No Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.373 0.385 0.387 
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Table 6: Monetary Outcomes  
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for variables used in Panel B. Panel B reports the results from an OLS model that models the monetary outcomes for 
each SEC enforcement. Our enforcement sample is after year 2009 because the meeting variable is only available after 2009. The dependent variable is natural 
log of 1 plus civil monetary settlement. In this table, Meeting equals one if the firm met with the SEC chair between investigation start date and enforcement 
start date, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Industry and year fixed effects are included for all regressions. Standard errors are clustered 
by issuer and reported in the brackets. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics                   
 Meet =1 (N=34)  Meet =0 (N=240) 
Variables 25%tile Median 75%tile SD Mean  25%tile Median 75%tile SD Mean 
Penalty (log) 13.082 13.122 15.425 2.457 12.929  11.918 14.880 16.524 5.527 13.886 
PAC 0 14.727 15.202 6.871 10.458  0 0 0 4.888 2.251 
DA -0.050 -0.024 0.019 0.107 -0.036  -0.052 0.003 0.051 0.139 -0.001 
Size 12.208 12.458 12.458 0.972 12.022  5.961 7.460 9.879 2.561 7.635 
M2B 0.755 1.055 1.493 0.942 1.184  0.924 1.649 3.092 4.580 2.875 
Leverage 0.910 0.923 0.955 0.094 0.901  0.382 0.506 0.682 0.226 0.527 
Age 18 21 33 7.057 24.118  17 26 39.5 17.072 30.021 
Distance 4.624 5.328 5.339 1.075 5.473  5.751 7.074 7.795 1.459 6.875 
Analyst 3 13.5 20 8.652 12.529  2 5 11 7.581 7.696 
Fortune 0 0 1 0.493 0.382  0 0 0 0.235 0.058 
Violation 0.693 0.693 1.099 0.264 0.866  0.693 1.099 1.386 0.367 1.070 
Fraud 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0.317 0.113 
Investigate 0 0 1 0.475 0.324  0 0 0 0.311 0.108 
Length 0 0 0 0.619 0.106  0 0 1.946 1.878 1.080 
Restate 0 0 0 0.359 0.147  0 0 0 0.322 0.117 
SEC Admin 1 1 1 0.171 0.971   0 1 1 0.483 0.633 
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Table 6 (continued)     
Panel B: Tobit regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Meet*PAC     -0.101 
      [0.142] 
Meet   -2.928** -2.101 
    [1.358] [1.785] 
PAC 0.03 0.049 0.07 
 [0.069] [0.069] [0.075] 
DA -1.727 -1.723 -1.777 
 [2.350] [2.329] [2.329] 
Size 1.492*** 1.536*** 1.546*** 
 [0.197] [0.196] [0.196] 
M2B 0.231*** 0.221*** 0.224*** 
 [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] 
Leverage -4.588*** -3.756** -3.797** 
 [1.709] [1.736] [1.736] 
Age 0.01 -0.005 -0.007 
 [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] 
Distance -0.288 -0.394* -0.419* 
 [0.228] [0.231] [0.233] 
Analyst -0.102* -0.094* -0.098* 
 [0.056] [0.056] [0.056] 
Fortune -1.434 -0.833 -0.724 
 [1.356] [1.372] [1.379] 
Violations -1.453 -1.225 -1.21 
 [1.085] [1.081] [1.081] 
Fraud -0.701 -0.762 -0.767 
 [1.211] [1.201] [1.201] 
Investigate 0.403 0.579 0.658 
 [0.937] [0.932] [0.938] 
Length 0.621*** 0.626*** 0.624*** 
 [0.206] [0.204] [0.204] 
Restate 0.208 0.243 0.262 
 [0.933] [0.925] [0.925] 
Constant 4.198 4.103 4.163 
 [3.108] [3.082] [3.082] 
    
Observations 274 274 274 
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.076 0.076 
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Table 7: Enforcement Venue 
This table reports results from a logit model predicting enforcement venue. The dependent variable equals 1 if the 
case was routed to the SEC administrative proceedings, and 0 if the case was routed to federal district court. Our 
enforcement sample is after year 2009 because the meeting variable is only available after 2009. In this table, 
Meet equals one if the firm met with the SEC chair between investigation start date and enforcement start date, 
and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Standard 
errors are clustered by issuer and reported in the brackets.  
(1) (2) (3) 
Meet   1.634* 1.757** 
    [0.914] [0.894] 
PAC 0.074**  0.078** 
 [0.032]  [0.033] 
DA 1.254 1.163 1.19 
 [2.031] [2.007] [1.980] 
Size 0.111 0.084 0.082 
 [0.263] [0.269] [0.267] 
M2B 0.124 0.115 0.122 
 [0.137] [0.128] [0.130] 
Leverage -0.888 -0.985 -1.216 
 [1.766] [1.754] [1.759] 
Age -0.082*** -0.076*** -0.077*** 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] 
Distance -0.716*** -0.679** -0.666** 
 [0.259] [0.277] [0.270] 
Analyst -0.051 -0.043 -0.051 
 [0.037] [0.039] [0.037] 
Fortune 0.634 0.804 0.529 
 [1.277] [1.356] [1.389] 
Violations -2.356* -2.475** -2.375* 
 [1.204] [1.209] [1.217] 
Fraud -0.418 -0.323 -0.375 
 [0.972] [0.974] [0.964] 
Investigate -0.517 -0.452 -0.558 
 [0.649] [0.630] [0.664] 
Length -1.004*** -1.001*** -0.998*** 
 [0.292] [0.292] [0.288] 
Restate 1.76 1.729 1.774 
 [1.086] [1.136] [1.113] 
Constant 
11.482**
* 11.415*** 11.334*** 
 [3.343] [3.324] [3.295] 
    
Observations 274 274 274 
Pseudo R2 0.495 0.499 0.507 
 
36 
 
Table 8: Changes in PAC Contributions 
Table 8 examines the changes in the total PAC contributions around SEC investigation periods. Panel A presents 
the PAC contributions in the year before, during, and after investigations for firms with and without meetings. 
The sample consists of all firms investigated by the SEC. Panel B reports the changes in PAC contributions and 
statistical tests of the changes across firms with and without meetings. 
 
Panel A: Changes in PAC for firms with and without meetings  
Chg in PAC (log) Meet = 1 Meet = 0  t-stat 
During Investigation - 1 Yr Before Investigation 1.712 0.275 9.649 
1 Yr After Investigation - During Investigation -0.014 -0.008 0.071 
 
Panel B: Distribution of PAC(log) by Meet and court 
 Federal Court Admin Proceeding Total 
Meet=0 2.162 2.303 2.251 
(N=88) (N=152) (N=240) 
Meet=1 0 10.775 10.458 
(N=1) (N=33) (N=34) 
Total 2.137 3.815 3.270 
  (N=89) (N=185) (N=274) 
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Table 9: Robustness Check -- Rare Logit 
This table presents the results of estimating the following logit model: Pr(Meeting) = f( Log_PAC, Bell_Weather, 
controls). The dependant variable equals 1 if the firm has met with the SEC, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard 
errors are reported in the brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  Industry and year fixed effects are included for all 
regressions. Standard errors are clustered by issuer and reported in the brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PAC 0.065**     0.060** 
  [0.029]     [0.030] 
Bellwether  0.077  -0.037 
  [0.334]  [0.337] 
E_Index   -0.052 -0.061 
   [0.167] [0.173] 
DA 0.868 0.907 0.894 0.869 
 [0.792] [0.771] [0.787] [0.797] 
Size 0.710*** 0.784*** 0.792*** 0.719*** 
 [0.103] [0.109] [0.114] [0.110] 
M2B -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] 
Leverage 2.259*** 2.379*** 2.466*** 2.327*** 
 [0.568] [0.527] [0.541] [0.590] 
Age -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
Distance -0.151 -0.169* -0.154 -0.141 
 [0.094] [0.095] [0.097] [0.095] 
Analyst 0.012 0.019 0.008 0.005 
 [0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.019] 
Fortune 0.204 0.319 0.218 0.124 
 [0.365] [0.357] [0.338] [0.349] 
FPS 0.858 0.79 0.816 0.869* 
 [0.527] [0.511] [0.507] [0.525] 
Constant -11.299*** -11.707*** -11.321*** -10.927*** 
 [1.150] [1.120] [1.319] [1.416] 
          
Observations 25,102 25,102 25,102 25,102 
Missing E-Index No No Yes Yes 
 
